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Executive Summary
In a period of stress in the relationship between the European Union and Turkey, co-
operation over energy could be a bright spot, because of strong mutual interests. However, 
EU-Turkey cooperation over energy requires a rethink. Up to now, gas and electricity have 
represented the main components of cooperation. Though highly visible, cooperation in 
these fields appears to be limited in practise.
By contrast, cooperation in other fields – such as renewables, energy efficiency, nucle-
ar energy and emissions trading – could make a real impact on long-term energy, climate and 
environmental sustainability, and on overall macroeconomic and geopolitical stability.
On renewables and energy efficiency, the EU could support Turkey by scaling-up the 
financial support it currently provides within the framework of its climate finance commit-
ments. This would reinforce the case for renewables and efficiency projects in Turkey, par-
ticularly as the cost of capital continues to represent a major barrier for these investments.
On nuclear energy, the EU can make a sensible contribution to the establishment of a 
nuclear energy sector in Turkey. This can notably be accomplished by integrating Turkey into 
the framework of Euratom.
On carbon markets, the EU can offer institutional support to Turkey, as is already being 
done with other countries such as China.
Refocusing bilateral cooperation on renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear 
energy and carbon markets would be more effective and strategic for both the EU and Turkey. 
For the EU, it would provide an opportunity to put its sustainable energy leadership aspira-
tions into practice, while opening up new commercial opportunities. For Turkey, it would 
enhance both climate and environmental performance, while reducing the energy import bill 
and energy dependency on Russia.
This change in priorities would also be important to head off Turkey’s rush into coal. 
Turkey currently has the third largest coal power plant development programme in the world, 
after India and China.
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1  Energy and climate within the broader EU-
Turkey relationship
The relationship between the European Union and Turkey has historically been close, con-
tested and tortuous. Turkey has sought to become a full member of the European integration 
project since 1987 but, notwithstanding significant advances such as the establishment of the 
EU-Turkey customs union in 1995, bilateral relations have faced many difficulties: the dispute 
over Cyprus, episodes of economic and political turbulence in Turkey, and the open opposi-
tion to Turkish EU membership of core EU countries such as Germany and France.
The EU-Turkey relationship has deteriorated recently because of the Turkish government’s 
worrying pattern of imprisonment of a large number of members of the political opposition, 
journalists and human rights defenders after the failed 2016 coup. In this context, the Euro-
pean Parliament demanded EU leaders suspend Turkey’s EU accession process. Numerous 
voices from European civil society and the political and academic spheres have even called 
for its termination.
In this complicated context, the EU-Turkey energy and climate relationship is consid-
ered by the EU as one of the few components of the EU-Turkey ‘Positive agenda’1 – areas in 
which strong mutual interests prevail even during politically difficult times (EEAS, 2017). The 
EU-Turkey bilateral energy policy relationship has developed over the years even though the 
energy chapter of Turkey’s EU accession process has never been opened, mainly as a result of 
Cyprus’ veto2.
However, the energy part of the ‘Positive agenda’ arguably requires a rethink. For example:
• Gas and electricity have traditionally represented the cornerstone of EU-Turkey bilateral 
cooperation, but their strategic relevance seem to be overrated given the current and 
likely future limited size of the regional gas transit and electricity trade;
• Renewables and energy efficiency have played a minor role in bilateral cooperation so far, 
while – considering Turkey’s untapped potential – they should play a central role;
• Nuclear energy and carbon markets have never been part of EU-Turkey bilateral cooper-
ation. These two gaps should be filled, considering Turkey’s new nuclear energy pro-
gramme and global climate change mitigation efforts.
Refocusing bilateral cooperation on renewable energy, energy efficiency, nuclear energy 
and carbon markets would be more impactful and strategic for both the EU and Turkey.  For 
the EU, it would provide an opportunity to put its sustainable energy leadership aspirations 
into practice, while opening up new commercial opportunities. For Turkey, it would enhance 
both climate and environmental performance, while reducing the energy import bill and 
energy dependency on Russia.
This change in priorities would also be important to avoid Turkey’s rush into coal. Turkey 
has put together the third largest coal power plant development programmes in the world 
after India and China, with more than 70 new coal-fired power plants currently in the pipe-
line, for a total planned installed capacity of 66.5 gigawatts3.
Turkey’s coal extraction and exploration activity has intensified in the last ten years, and 
lignite reserves have consequently almost doubled since 2004. The government supports coal 
1   Launched in 2012, the ‘positive agenda’ seeks to complement and enhance Turkey’s accession process by fostering 
cooperation in a number of areas of joint interest, including energy.
2   On this issue see for instance Karbuz (2014) and Colantoni et al (2017).
3   Turkish coal-fired power plants had an installed capacity of approximately 15.2 GW at the end of 2015 (20.6 percent 
of total power generation capacity). Hard coal-fired power plant installed capacity was 6.5 GW (8.8 percent) and the 
installed capacity using domestic lignite was 8.7 GW (11.8 percent). For full details of the Turkish coal-fired power 
plant construction programme, see https://euracoal.eu/info/country-profiles/turkey/.
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financially, either through production subsidies or investment incentives (eg special support 
for coal-fired power plants fuelled by domestic resources, value-added tax waivers, support to 
offset investment costs and tax reductions).
A renewed EU-Turkey energy and climate relationship focused on renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, nuclear energy and carbon markets could help head off this rush into coal, 
which would be highly detrimental for a wide range of climate, environmental and socio-eco-
nomic reasons.
2  Gas: an overstated component of bilateral 
cooperation?
Gas has always been at the heart of EU-Turkey energy discussions. Because of its strategic po-
sition between Europe and the gas-rich countries of the Caspian and the Middle East, Turkey 
has emerged as a potential key transit country, in a position to significantly contribute to the 
security of the EU gas supply.
In the early 2000s, developments became more concrete with discussions about the 
Nabucco pipeline, a project to channel up to 31 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas from 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran to Europe via Turkey. Nabucco became the flagship 
project of the Southern Gas Corridor, a European Commission initiative started in 2008 with 
the aim of reducing the EU’s perceived over-dependence on Russian gas supplies. The South-
ern Gas Corridor was intended to enable new supplies from the Caspian and Middle Eastern 
regions to reach Europe.
The early 2000s when Nabucco was the focus were the golden age of EU-Turkey energy 
cooperation. It seemed that, together with gas, pipelines could also channel economic pros-
perity and political cooperation4. However, the Nabucco project ultimately failed, for a variety 
of commercial and financial reasons5. The failure of Nabucco project left the way open for 
the emergence of a smaller-scale version of the Southern Gas Corridor, promoted by the only 
available regional supplier: Azerbaijan. Between 2011 and 2013, Azerbaijan proposed and 
started to develop the TANAP-TAP (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline) 
tandem, with the aim of providing six bcm of gas per year to Turkey and 10 bcm per year to 
Europe, starting in 20206.
The EU-Turkey gas cooperation momentum unexpectedly revived in 2015, when Russian 
President Vladimir Putin surprised the energy world by abandoning the long-debated South 
Stream project7 in favour of TurkStream, a project intended to deliver 63 bcm/year of Russian 
gas to Turkey and Europe by completely bypassing Ukraine. However, it quickly became 
4   In the spirit of the time, it might be useful to recall the declarations on the issue by then-president of the European 
Commission José Manuel Barroso, who said ‘’Nabucco could open the door to a new era in relations between Turkey 
and the EU and beyond’’, and by Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who said ‘’With Nabucco we are 
taking an important step for our countries, friendship and peace, and the welfare of upcoming generations’’.
5   Such as a weak outlook for EU natural gas demand, uncertain deliverability of supplies, potential competition from 
the Russian South Stream pipeline that was supposed to bring gas from Russia through the Black Sea to Bulgaria, and 
lack of guarantees or long-term ship-or-pay contracts that would facilitate access to bank loans.
6   For an in-depth analysis of these developments, see Tagliapietra (2017).
7   South Stream was a pipeline project to transport natural gas of the Russian Federation through the Black Sea to 
Bulgaria and through Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia further to Austria. The project was abandoned after a long-last-
ing dispute between Gazprom and the European Commission over the project’s compliance with EU legislation, and 
most notably with the EU Third Energy Package.
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evident that a full-scale version of the project would never be advanced8, and that only the first 
string of TurkStream would be built, with the aim of rechannelling by 2019 the Russian gas 
currently flowing to Turkey via the Trans-Balkan Pipeline (which links Turkey to Russia via Bul-
garia, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine)9. Only this first string is currently under construction.
As a result of the TANAP-TAP and TurkStream developments, the volume of gas supplied 
to the EU via Turkey will diminish overall by 2020 (Figure 1), because Turkey will no longer 
import Russian gas via EU countries and because the EU will only scale-up its imports via 
Turkey to 2.5 percent of its consumption.
Figure 1: EU-Turkey gas transit (2016 and 2020 scenarios)
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency.
Thus, in the short term the strategic relevance of gas in the EU-Turkey energy relationship 
seems to be overrated. In the longer term, cooperation on gas supply could increase only if:
1. The capacity of TurkStream would be doubled, with a second string aimed at suppling 
European markets. However, this is unlikely for both commercial and political reasons 
(Tagliapietra and Zachmann, 2015a);
2. The Southern Gas Corridor is expanded to Turkmenistan, Iraq and Iran. As noted by 
Tagliapietra and Zachmann (2015b), an expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor would 
be possible only if the EU and Turkey make use of their complementary leverage in the 
region to overcome the geopolitical and commercial barriers to the regional gas trade, and 
only if the future evolution of the EU’s gas import requirements justifies new investments 
in gas infrastructure. This is not something to be taken for granted, especially given the 
speed of the ongoing EU decarbonisation path.
8   The project ran into the same obstacles as South Stream – compliance with EU legislation – and faced high the infra-
structure costs of linking TurkStream to central European markets. 
9   See Tagliapietra and Zachmann (2015a).
28%
0.15%0%
2.48%
Imports to Turkey via EU (% of Turkey's gas consumption) Imports to EU via Turkey (% of EU gas consumption)
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Gas transit is not the only way to evaluate the strategic level of the EU-Turkey gas 
relationship. Even if limited in volumes, the Southern Gas Corridor could make it pos-
sible for both the EU and Turkey to access new suppliers. In gas markets, such options 
are an important asset, both for commercial and security reasons – notably in relation to 
large traditional suppliers such as Russia. However, in order to be effective, the available 
options should be viable and not hindered by geopolitical and commercial barriers10, as 
the Southern Gas Corridor continues to be.
It should also be noted that, notwithstanding the predominant role of gas in the 
EU-Turkey energy relationship, cooperation in the field has never been institutionalised. 
One of the reasons behind Turkey’s reluctance to engage in institutional platforms such 
as the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G) or the 
Energy Community is its unwillingness to liberalise its gas market. Turkey never fully 
implemented its Natural Gas Market Law of 2001 – which would align the Turkish market 
to the EU’s standards – notably to avoid splitting up the state-owned oil and gas com-
pany BOTAŞ and to avoid giving other companies non-discriminatory access to BOTAŞ’ 
pipelines.
3  Bilateral electricity cooperation: what’s 
really at stake?
Since the early 2000s, electricity has become an important component of the EU-Turkey 
energy relationship. 
Through its 2013 Electricity Market Law, Turkey liberalised its market in line with the 
EU Third Energy Package, which opened almost 90 percent of the EU electricity market to 
competition by the end of 2015 (IEA, 2016). 
In 2015, after a trial period lasting several years, TEİAŞ – the Turkish electricity grid 
operator – and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity– 
(ENTSO-E) signed a long-term agreement on permanent synchronous operation between 
the Turkish and continental European electricity systems. As a result, it became possible 
for Turkey to use interconnections with Bulgaria and Greece to export a maximum of 400 
megawatts (MW) and import up to 500 MW. TEİAŞ further strengthened its engagement 
with ENTSO-E in 2016 by becoming its first observer member (ENTSO-E, 2016).
On the basis of these developments, Bulgaria and Greece have since 2015 become 
Turkey’s main electricity trading partners. In 2015, Turkey imported 7.1 terawatt hours 
(TWh) of electricity from Bulgaria and 3.2 TWh from Greece – amounting to two percent 
of Turkey’s consumption (ENTSO-E, 2017). This electricity trade, however, remains limited 
both regionally and across the EU (Figure 2).
10  As outlined by Tagliapietra and Zachmann (2015), geopolitical issues such as the international dispute over the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea, the difficult political relationship between Iran and Turkey and the turbulent political 
situation in Iraq, all represent major barriers to the scaling-up of the Southern Gas Corridor. On top of this, there 
are commercial barriers, such as weak gas demand in Europe and low competitiveness compared to Russian gas 
supplies to Europe via existing infrastructure.
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Figure 2: The EU-Turkey electricity trade
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency.
4  Bilateral cooperation on renewables and 
efficiency: still a long way to go
EU-Turkey cooperation on renewables and energy efficiency is much less developed than co-
operation on gas and electricity, and has mainly consisted of European financial support for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in Turkey. This support has been provided 
by the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD) and the European Commission, and dates back as far as 1965 (Table 1).
Table 1: European financial support for renewable energy and energy efficiency in Turkey
EIB
Loans
1965 – 2006 €0.73 billion 21 projects
2007 – To date €2.43 billion 28 projects
Equity
2016 €13 million Clean Energy Transition Fund
2016 €50 million Green for Growth Fund
EBRD
Loans
2009 - 2016 €935 million 11 projects
Equity
2010, 2015 €122 million 2 projects
EBRD, 
EIB, EC 2011 – To date €1 billion
MidSEFF
(Turkish Mid-Size Sustainable 
Energy Financing Facility)
42 projects
Source: Bruegel based on EIB, EBRD, Midseff annual reports.
The most significant initiative currently in place is MidSEFF, a €1 billion facility that provides 
loans to Turkish banks to finance renewable energy, waste-to-energy and industrial energy effi-
ciency projects (MidSEFF, 2017). So far, 42 projects have been financed by this facility, and over 
700 MW have been added to Turkey’s renewable generation capacity (Rosca, 2015).
Stronger EU-Turkey cooperation in the field could have a major positive impact, par-
ticularly taking into account the still limited development of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency in Turkey.
2%
1%
Imports Exports
(A)
Share of trade with EU on Turkey's 
electricity consumption (2015)
0.10% 0.19%
Imports Exports
(B)
Share of trade with Turkey on EU's 
electricity consumption (2015)
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5  Nuclear energy: the first gap in bilateral 
cooperation
Since 2009, Turkey has developed plans to construct three nuclear power plants, in Akkuyu, 
Sinop and İğneada, on the basis of intergovernmental agreements with Russia, Japan and 
China, respectively. Preparations are most advanced at the Akkuyu site in southern Turkey, 
where the units should be online by 2023. For the Sinop and İğneada projects, feasibility stud-
ies are ongoing at the time of writing. 
Setting up a nuclear energy sector is an enormous task for any country, considering the 
size and complexity of the technical and regulatory challenges (IEA, 2016). Europe could 
make a sensible contribution to Turkey’s plans in this regard, notably via Euratom, which has 
cooperation agreements with third countries11.
Usually low-profile, Euratom has been brought into the spotlight by Brexit, which has 
highlighted the important, though low-key, functions of Euratom. These are i) to promote 
nuclear energy research, particularly on nuclear fusion; ii) to establish uniform safety stand-
ards and ensure that they are applied; iii) to ensure the regular supply of ores and nuclear 
fuels; iv) to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those for 
which they are intended; v) to ensure free movement of capital for investment in nuclear 
energy and free movement of employment for specialists in the sector.
Euratom could, with its well-established framework and expertise, provide Turkey with 
great support for the implementation of its nuclear energy plans. This would be positive for 
both Turkey and the EU, notably in terms of regional nuclear safety.
Engaging Turkey through Euratom appears to be a far more constructive approach than 
that pursued by the European Parliament in a July 2017 resolution, which called for Turkey to 
involve or consult neighbouring countries (eg Greece or Cyprus) in relation to the construc-
tion of the Akkuyu power plant12.
6  The carbon market: the second gap in 
bilateral cooperation
For Turkey, developing a full-fledged climate policy has never been a priority. Turkey became 
a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2004 and to the 
Kyoto Protocol in 2009, but because of its status as a developing country it was exempt from a 
binding emissions reduction target. In this context, Turkey has never considered the possibili-
ty of creating a carbon market (ICAP, 2017).
In the framework of the Paris Agreement, Turkey pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 21 percent below a business-as-usual scenario from 2021 to 2030 
(UNFCCC, 2015). Considering the current rising trend in Turkey’s greenhouse gas emissions, 
achieving this target is not going to be an easy task (Figure 3).
11  Euratom was founded in 1957 with the aim of creating a European market for nuclear power. It is composed of EU 
member states.
12  Resolution of 6 July 2017.
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Figure 3: Turkey’s and the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions (million tonnes CO2)
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency.
As suggested by the IEA (2016), Turkey should boost its institutional capacities and 
collaborations in the climate field by developing new financial mechanisms such as carbon 
markets. After all, this is exactly what other developing countries, notably China, are doing.
For example, MidSEFF includes a ‘Carbon Market Development Support Programme’ 
through which it seeks to contribute to the development of the Turkish carbon market. The 
programme, still in its embryonic phase, aims to promote the participation of Turkish banks 
and companies in carbon markets in Turkey and abroad by offering capacity building and 
support for carbon projects (Climate Focus, 2017).
Having developed the largest carbon market in the world, the EU could offer unique insti-
tutional support to Turkey in this field. Since 2014, the EU and China have cooperated on the 
design and implementation of China’s carbon market (European Commission, 2017). There is 
no reason why the EU and Turkey should not pursue similar cooperation.
7  Assessing the potential benefits of 
stronger EU-Turkey climate cooperation
In order to further develop the EU-Turkey energy and climate relationship, each partner’s 
priorities should be realistically assessed.
Promoting itself as a global leader in sustainable energy, the EU has a clear interest in 
cooperating on decarbonisation with third countries such as Turkey. This interest is polit-
ical as well as commercial, as Turkey represents an important – and still largely untapped 
– market for European companies dealing with renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
The one-gigawatt wind power project awarded to Siemens in August 2017 represents a good 
example of such potential (Reuters, 2017).
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Reinforced cooperation with the EU on climate issues could make an important contri-
bution to Turkey’s decarbonisation. However, given Turkey’s still modest political momen-
tum on the issue, decarbonisation should not be considered as the winning argument to 
engage Turkey in stronger cooperation in the field. By contrast, Turkish policymakers are 
likely to be receptive to solutions that reduce the country’s external energy dependency in a 
sustainable manner.
8  Reducing Turkey’s external energy 
dependency while avoiding the coal rush
Having negligible domestic resources, Turkey imports almost all of the oil and gas it con-
sumes. The Turkish government considers this to be a major vulnerability, both from an 
economic (ie the energy import bill) and a foreign policy (ie over-reliance on Russian gas) 
perspective (Kömürcüler, 2017)(Figure 4).
Figure 4: Turkey’s external energy vulnerability
Source: Bruegel based on Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and International Energy Agency.
Officially, the Turkish government wants to reduce its external energy dependency by 
“increasing the share of renewable energy sources in and adding the nuclear power to its energy 
mix”13. A national renewable energy target of 30 percent of the total electricity generated has 
been set for 202314, alongside an energy efficiency target that would reduce the country’s 
energy intensity by at least 20 percent between 2011 and 2023. However, these targets seem 
rather questionable because:
1. The renewable target lacks ambition: the 2023 target was already met in 2015 on the basis 
of existing hydropower;
13  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017).
14  Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (2015).
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2. The energy efficiency target seems to exist only on paper because between 2005 and 2015, 
Turkey’s energy intensity (ie energy consumption per unit of GDP) increased by 7 percent, 
while it decreased in all other IEA countries by 16 percent on average.
In reality, as previously noted, the Turkish government seems to be addressing Turkey’s 
energy import dependency issue by making greater use of coal. According to estimates by 
Sahin et al (2016), Turkey’s current coal programme could double the country’s greenhouse 
gas emissions from around 460 million tons in 2013 to around 860 million tons per year.
In addition to its clearly detrimental impact on the climate, this programme would have 
other negative effects:
1. Pollution: coal also has negative impacts in terms of air, water, soil and food pollution;
2. Health: coal emissions have a number of adverse effects on human health, from respira-
tory and circulatory system diseases to respiratory system cancers;
3. Public finance: subsidies to the coal industry, accrued healthcare costs arising from coal-related 
diseases, and coal-related environmental costs negatively impact Turkey’s public finances;
4. Safety: as demonstrated by the May 2014 disaster at the Soma coal mine in western 
Turkey, in which 301 miners were killed, coal exploitation can have huge human costs. 
Expanding coal mining will inevitably increase this risk.
For all these reasons, Turkey should avoid a coal rush. The EU can provide support by 
making a stronger case for renewables and energy efficiency investment in Turkey.
9  Supporting Turkey’s sustainable energy 
transition with climate finance
Over the last decade, wind and solar power have become increasingly cost-competitive with 
conventional generation technologies because of material declines in the pricing of system 
components and dramatic improvements in efficiency. For instance, Lazard (2016) estimates 
wind costs to have decreased by 66 percent since 2009 and utility-scale solar to have de-
creased by 85 percent.
However, given the high share of capital cost for renewables, the main variable for the 
speed at which renewables can become competitive in Turkey is the cost of capital. This is 
also the case for EU countries, where the cost of capital for renewable investments ranges 
from 3.5 percent in Germany to 12 percent in Greece, as a consequence of different policy 
risks for investors (eg differences in the national regulatory frameworks that support the 
deployment of renewable energy sources; see Ecofys, 2016).
The EU could make a considerable contribution in terms of lowering the cost of capital for sus-
tainable energy investments in Turkey, notably by scaling-up its blended finance toolkit for Turkey’s 
sustainable energy projects, ie subsidising investments in Turkey by taking over some risks.
In the framework of the Paris Agreement, developed countries extended their goal of 
jointly making available $100 billion per year until 2025 to support mitigation and adapta-
tion action in developing countries. For instance, in 2015 did the EU and its member states 
contribute €17.6 billion to this climate finance effort, of which €1.5 billion came from the EU 
budget and €2.2 billion from the EIB15.
Greater EIB engagement in Turkey would leverage additional financing, in particular from 
the private sector, because its risk-mitigation and credit-enhancement tools would reduce 
15  European Council (2016). For an in-depth discussion of EU climate finance, see Wolff and Zachmann (2015).
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the risks for private investors and would enable European energy companies to act more 
confidently in the Turkish market. This would seem to be particularly important in the current 
investment climate, in which foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey is rapidly falling (from 
$17 billion in 2015 to $12 billion in 2016; see OECD, 2017).
Given the magnitude of Turkey’s coal programme and of the related potential green-
house gas emissions, increasing the EIB’s support for the development of renewable energy 
and energy efficiency in Turkey would be a significant step in contributing to global climate 
change mitigation.
10 Conclusions
Cooperation over energy and climate issues could be one of the few components of the 
EU-Turkey positive agenda. However, to make a real impact on long-term energy, climate and 
environmental sustainability and on overall macroeconomic and geopolitical stability, cur-
rent priorities in the field should be changed, shifting the focus from the highly visible but less 
impactful gas and electricity sectors to sectors such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, 
nuclear energy and carbon trading.
On renewables and energy efficiency, the EU should scale-up the financial support it cur-
rently provides within the framework of its climate finance commitments. This would make 
a stronger case for renewables and efficiency projects in Turkey, particularly as the cost of 
capital continues to represent a major barrier for these investments.
On nuclear energy, the EU can make a sensible contribution to the establishment of a 
nuclear energy sector in Turkey. This can notably be accomplished by integrating Turkey into 
the framework of Euratom.
On carbon markets, the EU can offer institutional support to Turkey, as is already being 
done with other countries such as China.
Only by shifting these priorities can EU-Turkey energy and climate cooperation take on 
a truly strategic role as part of the EU-Turkey relationship and ultimately become a vibrant 
component of a much-awaited ‘positive agenda.
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